There is widespread evidence that bidders are more highly valued than their targets, and that both parties tend to be in temporarily high-valued industries. Many argue that such evidence suggests that market misvaluation, rather than the synergy or empire-building deals drives most acquisition decisions. However, this is not obvious given that firms in the same industry persistently trade at widely different valuation multiples. Our evidence also suggests that the driving force is more prosaic than managers' exploiting market mis-valuation. Rather, it appears that the driver of acquisition decisions is often a desire to increase earnings or book per share (this is labeled the "bootstrap game" in the classic text of Brealey and Myers). We find that a firm is more likely to be a target when other firms in the industry could acquire them in a stock-swap merger that is accretive to the buyer while paying the target a substantial premium. The resulting measure is similar to the dispersion of valuation multiples within an industry, but is grounded in a specific model of managerial behavior and is empirically much stronger than dispersion. Indeed, it is stronger than any measure in the existing literature, including recent industry merger activity.
Introduction
It has recently been argued that acquisitions are driven by mis-valuation rather than the synergies or managerial objectives stressed in the earlier literature (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Jensen and Fuller, 2005; Rhodes-Kropf and Vishwanathan, 2004) ). This view is buttressed by evidence that bidders are more highly valued than their targets (Dong et al, 2006) , and that both parties tend to be in temporarily high-valued industries (Rhodes-Kropf and Vishwanathan, 2005) . The economic importance of the valuation motive remains unclear. In particular, how likely are two firms with different valuations to consummate a merger, and how important is the effect relative to other well-known drivers? We find that valuation differences are twice as important as recent industry activity (stressed by Mitchell-Mulherin, 1996, and Harford, 2005) , and dwarf the effect of size, leverage, profitability, or any stand-alone valuation ratio.
Our evidence also suggests that the driving force is more a desire to increase earnings or book value per share (the "bootstrap game" in the classic text of Brealey, Myers and Allen (208)) than to exploit market mispricing. We find that a firm is more likely to be a target when other firms in the industry could acquire them in a stock-swap merger that is accretive to the buyer even after paying the target a substantial premium. The resulting measure is similar to the dispersion of valuation multiples within an industry (as used in Harford, 2005) , but is grounded in a specific model of managerial behavior and empirically is much stronger than dispersion. The effects are somewhat weaker when we use more sophisticated valuation models, and we do not find that earnings accretion becomes important relative to book in industries where earnings are more persistent. One finding is consistent with models of market mis-valuation, however, as suggested by Rhodes-Kropf and Vishwanathan (2004; our effects are stronger when average industry multiples are temporarily elevated.
Our basic approach is to deem two firms as a viable candidate to merge if they are in the same 2-sigit SIC industry, and if by using stock as the method of payment can increase the per-share earnings or book of the buyer (literally, the party with the higher multiple) in the hypothetical deal. Controlling for both year and industry fixed effects, as well as a continuous measure of recent merger activity by industry, we find strong evidence that a firm is more likely to be sold (and at a higher premium) if it has more viable buyers.
Our results are robust to the assumed premium the buyer must pay. We find strong results if we require the deal to be accretive on a book or earnings basis, but less so when we combine book and earnings into a more defensible (residual income-based) valuation framework. This last result needs to be interpreted with some caution as we follow Dong et al (2006) and require analyst forecast information for our residual income formulation. A less data-intensive way to ask if acquirers care more about economic value than accounting data is to see if earnings weighs more heavily than book in industries where earnings are more persistent (and hence would loom larger relative to book in fundamental valuation for the firm). We do not find this effect in the data, suggesting either that managers are seeking aspects of synergies that we cannot observe, or as suggested by survey evidence in Graham and Harvey (2001) , that they care more about accounting ratios than about value as defined in finance theory.
There is a rich literature on both the theoretical and empirical sides with respect to whether misvaluation drives merger activity. First, we discuss the main theories. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) develop a model in which the CEOs of acquirers take advantage of market misvaluation by using overvalued stock as currency to buy relatively less overvalued targets. Valuation is a multiple of the capital of the firm. There is short-term misvaluation on the capital of both firms, although in the long run the valuation of the capital of both firms will be the same. The acquirer has a higher multiple and hence is more overvalued. The market will assign a multiple to evaluate the capital of combined firm. The multiple will fall between the multiple for the capital of the acquirer and the multiple for the capital of the target. So, the target benefits in the short term by getting a premium in the deal, although they actually get less share of the combined firm in terms of their long-run value. The acquirer actually benefits in the long term by getting a larger share of the combined firm than they can get if both firms are evaluated in the long run value. Thus, the acquirer turns the overvalued equity into hard assets. Our screens capture a simple version of their model where the managers believe the market will apply the acquirer's multiple to the combined entity ( = 1 in their terminology) and where relative bargaining power ( in their model) is such that the buyer must pay a 20 percent premium for the target. Our results are robust to reasonable alterations in these parameters. Fuller and Jensen (2002) maintain that some CEOs engage in an earnings game by catering to analysts with high guidance on earnings. Jensen (2005) further predicts that overvalued equity may lead to bad acquisitions, which reduces the core value of the firms and results in poor long-term operating performance. This approach is also consistent with our approach; in terms of the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) (hereafter SV) model it would be that managers mistakenly or carelessly believe that the market will use the acquirer's multiple for the combined entity.
Rhodes- Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) (hereafter RKV) offer a model also based on market misvaluation, but target CEOs are not myopoc nor self-interested as in Shleifer and Vishny (2003) .
Instead, the stock values of both targets and acquirers can deviate from their long-run fundamental values. RKV separates misvaluation into a market-wide (or sector) component and a firm component. The target CEOs cannot tell how much of this misvaluation is due to firm specific reasons or market/sector misvaluation. The market-wide component in misevaluations is common to both firms. The target CEOs correctly adjust downward the stock offer by the acquirer, but they still accept the offer because they overestimate the synergies owing to the common misvaluation of market (or sector). Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2006) test both misvaluation and Q theories of mergers.
They use price-to-book to proxy for a firm's growth opportunities in Q theory and also as a proxy for misvaluation. They also use price-to-value as an additional proxy for misvaluation. They adopt a similar approach as Lee, et al (1999) to calculate the residual income value of a firm. They test the two theories by linking these two proxies to the characteristics of merger deals. They find evidence for both hypotheses, and further find that the evidence for Q hypothesis is stronger in the pre-1990s period than in the 1990-2000 period, while the evidence for misvaluation is stronger in the 1990-2000 period. One key difference from our paper is that their tests focus only on deals that actually take place. Our sample will include nearly all firms for which there is publicly-available data.
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) test the RKV and SV models using a valuation model that includes book values, net income and leverage to decompose the market value mispricing into three components: a firm specific error, a sector mispricing error and a long-run mispricing error. They find that both targets and acquirers have higher market-to-book (M/B) relative to non-merger firms, and high M/B targets are bought by even higher M/B acquirers. The firm-specific error is higher for acquirers than targets in the overall merger sample and for the stock-financed sample. However, they also find that low long-run value-to-book firms acquire high long-run value-to-book targets. This is puzzling given existing theory, especially Q theory which says that firms with high growth opportunities buy firms with low growth opportunities. They argue that the contradicting results of high M/B buying low M/B and long-run value-to-book buying high long-run value-to-book call for some form of market inefficiency and informational asymmetry. However, one can argue that the puzzle may be also attributed to their empirical model of valuation since it most likely omits some other risk factors and also relies on peek-ahead to identify misvaluation. Specifically, they say that a sector is over-priced when its regression-based valuation multiple is above the full-sample average. The latter information would only be available to actual participants at the end of the sample.
There are some other papers focusing on testing whether the acquisitions benefit or hurt the shareholders of the acquiring firms. Ang and Cheng (2006) use the similar P/B and P/V approach and have similar findings as in Dong et al (2006) . Further, they show that the shareholders of acquirers in stock mergers are as well off as, if not better off than, the shareholders of similarly overvalued non-acquiring firms. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) find that negative bidder returns from 1998 to 2001 are driven by a few deals in which the bidders of extremely high valuation suffer huge losses after merger. They find that such firms have high q's and high market-to-book ratios. Thus, this provides support for Fuller and Jensen (2002) that managers of high valuation firms make poor acquisitions. However, the negative returns can also be due to the market's adjustment of the true stand-alone value of such firms. Song (2007) uses the trading of insiders as an indication of the overvaluation of their firms. She finds a strong relation between the insider selling prior to the merger announcement and long-run post-acquisition performance in the "hot market" period of 1997-2000. Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) find that acquisitions in high valuation period generate a significantly lower long-term abnormal return for the buyers and suffer a significantly lower longrun operating performance. However, they show that market timing is not likely an explanation for the underperformance of acquirers in high valuation market. Fu, Lin and Officer (2008) investigate whether acquirer shareholders benefit from acquisitions driven by equity overvaluation. They sort acquisitions by relative overvaluation before announcement. Their findings support Jensen's (2005) hypothesis that equity overvaluation generates substantial agency costs for shareholders. Bi and Gregory (2008) use UK data and find more support for the market misvaluation hypothesis than the Q theory, however they cannot comprehensively reject Q theory explanation.
In contrast to much of the aformentioned literature, our setup is appealing because it does not require specifying an asset pricing model. Just as importantly, we need not condition on a deal or even a bid taking place. Future research can overlay proxies for market misvaluation and/or managerial incentive alignment to tease out who, if anyone, is at fault in what we uncover. What we can say, however, is that valuation differences are economically important to the market for corporate control.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a simple model of mergers based on the framework of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and describes our viable buyer and target approach and the corresponding predictions. Section 3 describes the sample and methodology, and Section 4 presents the empirical results, including the results obtained when the acquisition premium is varied. Section 5 concludes. Appendix A contains details related to the SDC dataset, and Appendix B is a summary of our empirical variables definitions.
A Simple Model of Mergers and Hypothesis
We develop a simple model of mergers following Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and then derive two new, empirically-testable predictions. As in SV, consider a representative merger pair, denoted firm 0 and firm 1. Firm 0 (firm 1) has K 0 (K 1 ) units of capital and the stock price is a multiple Q 0 (Q 1 ) of capital. Assume without loss of generality that 1 > 0 , so firm 1 is the prospective acquirer and firm 0 the prospective target. The key parameter in SV is , the synergy that the market attaches to the combined entity. Specifically, the market value of the combined entity is
. SV refer to this as the short-term market value, so that can contain pricing errors. In the baseline case where there are no synergies and the market is efficient, = 1 /( 1 + 0 ). The target firm shareholders and management are assumed able to cash out immediately after the deal closes so they are not concerned with longer-term value. Hence what really matters for the viability of the combination is the bidding firm's view of .
The second component of SV's model is the longer-term return to the two entities. The key component of this analysis for our purposes (predicting the incidence of mergers) is the fact that the bidder must pay a non-zero premium given by a percent of target value. Finally, assume without loss of generality that both firms have a single share outstanding and that the acquirer issues an additional shares to the target. We now have two conditions for a merger pair to be viable. First, the bidder must provide enough shares to cover the required premium of Π:
Second, the bidder must not expect to lose market value from the bid:
The problem with taking this to the data is that we cannot observe s. Two extreme cases are instructive. In an efficient market with no synergies (i.e., the case where = 1 /( 1 + 0 )), then the two conditions above can never be satisfied for any Π > 0. This simply says that the bidder cannot offer a premium if there is no gain to the merger, efficiency-based or otherwise. At the other extreme, if = 1 the bidder at least believes the market will apply her higher multiple to the target's assets, then conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied so long as:
This is a straightforward, if extreme, bootstrapping result. The bidder expects the market to apply her multiple to all the target's assets, so as long as her multiple exceeds that of the target by more than the premium, the deal is viable. The starkness of the result makes it useful for expositional purposes, but taking it to the real-world data requires us to consider (at least) three issues.
First, for most reasonable premia, the dispersion of multiples by industry means that many firms have multiple viable buyers; this implies an unconditional likelihood of takeover at least an order of magnitude greater than what we observe in the data. A simple way to accommodate this fact is to posit that most potential bidders, say a fraction X of the population, do not believe in the bootstrap game. Since only one viable bidder is required for the firm to be taken over, if we denote the number of firms that satisfy conditions (1) and (2) by , a potential target is taken over with probability 1 − . While we do not actually know X, this observation suggests we should apply a concave transformation to the number of viable bidders when we come to our empirical tests. 1
Secondly, relative size does not matter, because when = 1 even a small bidder can apply her multiple to a big target. This may seem counterintuitive, but Harford (1999) surprisingly finds that targets are not on average small firms and we confirm this basic result in our data. To further investigate the idea, in the robustness section we experiment with adding the requirement that the bidder's assets be greater than those of the target ( 1 > 0 ).
And finally, we have thus far adopted the Shleifer-Vishny model assumption that differences in multiples are primarily due to mispricing rather than appropriate valuation of different risk or expected cash-flows (at least, we have done so in the = 1 case). Much of the subsequent empirical literature (Dong et al 2004 , Rhodes-Kropf et al 2005 attempt to specify valuation models in order to isolate mispricing. Our approach does not hinge on the correctness of pricing model, so far as the errors in the pricing model are uniform among merger firms and non-merger firms, our relative measure of viable buyers or targets are able to filter out the errors and hence do a better test.
Our approach hinges on a critical intuition, that is, in order for the misvaluation theories to work, it is not enough for a stock to be overpriced relative to its own intrinsic valuation. It must be that the stock is overvalued relative to other stocks in the economy such that using stock as currency in the acquisition becomes attractive to the acquirer. One way to measure whether it is an attractive deal to the acquirer is whether the deal can increase the book value per share. In fact, the theories either implicitly or explicitly argue that the CEOs of the acquirers care whether a deal is accretive on a book value (or earnings) per share basis or not. We do not argue whether issuing stock to increase book value (or earnings) per share is efficient or not as the theories have opposing predictions. But no matter whether it is efficient or not, for a deal to happen, the acquirer must gain something, which in our context is the acquisition of the target's assets on the cheap.
Mis-valuation happens when a firm's stock is either undervalued or overvalued. However, for misvaluation to drive stock-based mergers, it also requires that one firm's stock price relative to another firm becomes so mispriced such that a deal with a decent premium is attractive to both firms. For the target, so far as the premium exceeds its undervaluation, the deal is acceptable. For the buyer, so far as the deal can increase its book value per share after issuing shares to pay the target, the deal is viable. We then argue that the merger likelihood is related to the number of viable buyers or targets. For a firm to sell itself, the possibility for it to find a buyer which is able to pay it a desired premium increases with the number of viable buyers. The more viable buyers, the larger the chance that some of the viable buyers are able to pay target's desired premium. This is more likely to happen when the stock price is undervalued relative to other firms or there are more overvalued stocks. Similarly, the possibility for a firm to make a stock-based acquisition increases with the number of viable targets. The more viable targets, the higher the chance that some of the viable targets are able to increase the book value per share of the buyer to its desired level. This is also more likely to happen when the stock price is overvalued relative to other firms or there are more undervalued stocks.
Hence, we obtain the following two predictions based on misvaluation-driven-merger theories and our approach of viable buyers and targets.
H1: The likelihood of a firm being a target is positively related to the number of viable buyers.
Furthermore, since we argue that merger activities are driven by relative misvaluation which is captured by our viable buyers and targets based on stock financed deals, we have the following additional prediction.
H2:
The likelihood of the use of stock as method of payment is positively related to the number of viable buyers and viable targets.
In the next section, we will take these predictions to the data.
Sample and Empirical Methodology
We begin by detailing our data collection process, then lay out a roadmap for our empirical specification, our variables of interest, and our controls. We close this section by revealing our summary statistics.
Data
The merger data are from SDC Platinum dataset. We download deals with domestic targets from the SDC database from year 1979 to year 2008. The search criteria include the following: 1. The form of the transaction must be either "M", "AM", "A" or "AA". 2. Deal type is either 1, 2, 3 or 4. (See the Appendix for the definitions from SDC.) We do not include other types of deals because we are only interested in deals where the buyers have a controlling interest after the deals, and hence can integrate (or consolidate) the targets' assets into their balance sheet to reflect the change of book value per share.
We then drop the duplicate records when all of target's cusip, acquirer's cusip, date announced, and status are the same. All together we have 173,719 records of announcements. We further drop the record if the same target and acquirer pair was recorded more than once in the same year (drops 385 records) or was recorded in the prior year (drops 328 records). Then, we further drop the record if the same target was reported more than once in the same year (drops 3,594 records) and was reported the prior year (drops 2,632 records). After applying these filters, each target has only one record for each calendar year. 2
We next merge the SDC data with a file called 'stocknames' from WRDS in order to attach eight digit cusip to the targets. Then, we calculate target excess return using the market model, obtaining 11,276 records target firms' excess returns. To merge with CRSP Compustat, we first obtain the calendar year from data date of CRSP Compustat (the date is the day on the end of the fiscal year up to which the company reports it annual statement). Then, we merge SDC with CRSP Compustat by matching cusip and calendar year. This step matches 2,721 target firms into CRSP Compustat and we create a dummy variable takeover which equals to 1 for the target in the calendar year. However, some target firms didn't provide annual reports in the year when they were acquired.
The above combination process misses many target firms. To overcome this problem, we artifi- targets. For the acquirer sample, it is relatively easy because usually the acquirers's financial data are available in the merger year. We also restrict this sample to 1981 to 2007, resulting in 4,867 acquirer firm-years. The number is actually smaller than that of targets alone because we only allow a firm to be an acquirer once a year.
To calculate EPS-based and intrinsic value-based numbers of viable buyers and targets, we also use I/B/E/S earnings annual forecast data. We use the fiscal year one's average EPS forecast in I/B/E/S as the expected EPS for the firms in the year. In order to use the residual income model to calculate a firm's intrinsic value, we also use I/B/E/S year two and year three (when available)
EPS forecasts, along with the long-term growth rate forecast. We will discuss it in detail next.
Empirical Specification and Key variable
In our empirical tests, we are interested in finding out whether our measure of the number of viable buyers or targets are related to the likelihood of a firm being a target. We test it by estimating the following Probit regression model for merger likelihood:
The subscript i refers to firm i, the subscript t refers to time in years, the subscript j refers to industry, refers to time fixed effects and refers to industry fixed effects. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for merger. In the regression of target likelihood, will be equal to 1 if firm i is a target at year t and 0 otherwise. The corresponding is the number of viable buyers for firm i at year − 1. 's are the control variables including firm i's size, market to book ratio, return on assets, leverage, price to earning ratio and liquidity. is the level and standard deviation of the related key variable within the industry at year t. is the number of takeover happened in firm i's industry j. In the regression of the likelihood of using stock as the method of payment, is the dummy variable which equals to 1 if the deal uses only stock as the method of payment and 0 otherwise.
Test Variables
To compute the number of viable buyers for each firm, we assume that any potential buyer will pay for the target with its own equity. For a given firm each year, we compute the number of firms that are able to make an equity-financed deal that is earnings per share accretive and pays a 20% We search for viable buyer-target matches at the two-digit SIC industry level. We apply only one filter to make our search more realistic, that is, a firm can only buy another firm which is less than four times its own asset size. Such a restriction is reasonable because such mega deals are both rare and pose potentially greater integration difficulties for the buyers. In the actual merger deals, less than 2% of acquirers bought firms that are four times as big as its own asset size. Without such a restriction, an overvalued small firm may issue a ridiculous multiple of its existing shares to buy a relatively undervalued big firm.
For the hypothesized deals that are either earnings accretive or increase intrinsic value, we turn to the I/B/E/S data set for earnings forecasts. We use the forecasted earnings from I/B/E/S and the mean of analysts' EPS forecast to proxy for the expected earnings in each firm. I/B/E/S typically provides annual earning forecasts out two years into the future. For the EPS-based viability measure, we only use the next year's forecast. But for the intrinsic value-based viability measure, we rely on the first two years' forecast and the estimated rate of long-term growth.
I/B/E/S updates analysts' forecasts every month. Since we are doing the estimation on a yearly basis, we use only one month's forecast. We choose the month when the forecasted date becomes the one year forecast for the first time. This usually happens when a firm announces its annual report and the analysts start to shift their forecast to the following year. Thus, it should capture the new information available in the beginning of this fiscal year.
We follow mostly the method described in Dong et al (2006) 
Control variable
Since we are first trying to predict the likelihood of a firm becoming a target, we rely on the relevant control variables based on the merger prediction literature. We use size (log of assets) to proxy for the transaction cost of integration and the barrier to takeover. Past studies (Hasbrouck 1985 , Palepu 1986 , Mikkelson and Partch,1989 show that the likelihood of being a target is negatively related to the size of the firm. We also control for each firm's equity's market-to-book ratio. Hasbrouck (1985) argues that it can be a proxy for management incompetence and low cost resources for acquirers. In the declining industry, takeover is more likely in industries with the ratio less than 1. He finds negative and significant effect of market to book ratio on likelihood of being a takeover target. We also control for a firm's Tobin's q, which is the market-to-book value of a firm's assets, where the market value of assets is defined as total assets plus market value of common stock minus book common equity and differed taxes. Cremers, Nair and John, (2008) finds that a firm's q is negatively related to the probability of being a target. 4 We control for return on assets (ROA) which is the ratio of net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations to the total assets. Low ROA implies inefficient and hence the firm is more likely to be target. Cremers, Nair and John (2008) find that ROA is negatively related to the likelihood of being a target. Since Cremers, Nair and John (2008) also find that leverage has a positive and significant effect on being a takeover target, we also include leverage measured as book value of debt divided by total assets as a control. Harford (1999) shows that the stock price to earning ratio is positively related to the likelihood of being a target, so we also control for it.
We include liquidity as a control variable as in Hasbrouck (1985) because it is easier for a bidder to secure a toehold in a more liquid target. Lastly, we use the same set of firm's financial variables in the regression of likelihood of being an acquirer as we expect such variables should have opposite effects. For the ratio variables, we winsorize them at the 1% level to trim extreme outliers.
Next, we sort the data by two-digit SIC (Standard Industrial Classification code) and calendar year. We then compute the number of takeover variable ("Num Takeover") which measures the total number of takeovers in the industry in the year. We expect the takeover activities in the industry will cause other firms to take similar action due to the change of competitive cost advantage.
We also include year and industry fixed effects and cluster the standard errors at the industry level. It is generally agreed that mergers happen more frequently in booming markets (see Figure   1 which highlights the positive correlation between the number of acquisitions and the level of the S&P 500 Index) and cluster in some industries. We want to be sure that our results are not caused simply by shocks to the entire economy or just in some industries, and also that we are not picking up any other year effect. An economic shock will cause overall stock price movement in the entire economy or the industry, but we are more interested in how the relative misvaluation differences caused by the shock relates to observed merger activities. To make sure our results are not driven by any industry change, we also include industry level (mean) and standard deviation of the following variables: price-to-earning ratio, market-to-book ratio and the price-to-intrinsic-value ratio. These are all relevant to our computation of the viable buyers and targets. Buttressing this claim, Figure 2 illustrates the positive relation between the number of deals and the market-to-book dispersion each year).
Summary Statistics
We first present the summary statistics of our key variables in the Panel A of Table 1 Observe that the means and medians of viable buyers (and viable targets) are quite different. Figure 3 highlights that the distribution is seriously right-skewed. Hence, following Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Milbourn (2003) , we use the empirical cumulative density function (CDF) to normalize the independent variables and run regression with these transformed variables. 5
In Panel B of Table 1 , we also report the lagged means and medians of our control variables.
The mean differences between the target sample and non-target sample (and between the acquirer sample and non-acquirer sample) are all significant, and almost always at the 1% level. Some of the differences are in accordance to the literature. For example, the market to book ratio for the target sample is lower than that of the non-target sample. Also, the price to earning ratio in the acquirer sample is much larger than that in the non-acquirer sample. Hence, these variables are arguably relevant controls for our tests.
We also calculate the correlation between our test variables, and these are in contained in Panel C. The viable buyers variables are positively correlated among themselves, but not perfectly so, suggesting that our measures of viability are picking up different facets of managerial behavior.
The viable target variables are similarly correlated. The correlations between viable buyers and targets are very low, and even negative for RIM based variables. Otherwise, there are few surprises revealed here.
Main Empirical Results
We present our results in the following order. We first investigate the likelihood of being a target and then the likelihood of use of stock as the method of payment. In testing both of these hypotheses, we begin by using our EPS-based test variable to capture the number of viable buyers, identified by Accretive Bidders. We then turn to our alternative definitions of "viable", including the book-based measure (Book Bidders) and our residual-income-based measure (RIM Bidders). In all cases, we report the marginal effects of the probit regressions.
Predicting Takeover Targets Based on the Number of Viable Buyers
We first use our proxy for the number of viable buyers and targets based on whether a deal is EPS accretive to the buyer. These results are in Table 2 . We estimate a probit model to test whether the likelihood of being a takeover target is related to the number of viable buyers. The dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm is a takeover target and 0 otherwise. We use the CDF transformation of independent variables in the regressions. We run a baseline regression in column 1, add the target's Industry P/E level in the second column, and lastly add the target's Industry P/E Standard Deviation in the third column. The coefficients for viable buyer measure (Accretive Bidders) in the three regressions are all positive and significant at the 1% level. Observe that the coefficients for Industry P/E Level and Standard Deviation are small and not significant.
We can calculate the marginal effects of the probit regressions in order to interpret the economic significance. The predicted probability of being a target in the third regression (column 3) is 2.5%
at the mean of regression variables. So, for a firm with average attributes across the board, including the number of viable buyers, the (unconditional) probability of being a target is 2.5%.
The coefficient for the variable Accretive Bidders in this marginal regression is 0.034. Hence, if the number of viable buyers goes up from the median (i.e. the mean of the CDF transformed variable) level to the maximum, the probability of being a target increases to 4.2%. Hence, our result is economically significant. Also, the magnitude of the coefficient on the variable Accretive Bidders is bigger than those of the control variables, which indicates the viable buyer variable has a dominant effect on a firm to be a takeover target. Some of the control variables have signs in accordance with the literature, while some have opposite signs. The number of takeovers in a firm's industry in the previous year increases the firm's likelihood of being a target. A firm's return on assets is negatively related to the target likelihood. The firm's level of liquidity also increases the probability of being target.
Most striking is our result related to the effect of firm size on the likelihood of being a takeover target, which is quite different from the prior literature. When we allow for only a linear relationship with respect to firm size, we find that a firm's size is positively related to the likelihood of being a target. Harford (1999) also uses the log value of target asset as proxy for size and finds that the coefficient is not significant in the prediction of merger targets. To further investigate the issue of size, we also split the sample according to the firm size. In unreported results, we find that the coefficient for size is negative in the sub-sample of firms above the median size and positive in the sub-sample of firms below the median size, with both significant at the 1% level. Hence the finding on the size effect from prior literature is more likely from the relatively large firms, which is reasonable because large firms create a greater barrier to being acquired. Thus, our finding points a nonlinear relationship between size and the likelihood of being a target. Since the effect of size on merger activity is not the primary issue in our paper, we simply add the square of the size in the regression to control for this nonlinear relationship. Then, the sign of size becomes negative and not significant, as shown in Table 2 .
Next, we present our tests related to whether the likelihood of being a target is related to the number of viable buyers based on book value and report the results in Table 3 . From the first three columns, we find that the variable Book Bidders is positively associated with the probability of being a takeover target and is significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of the coefficient is almost the same (0.034) as that of Accretive Bidders, while the Industry M/B Level and Standard
Deviation again have no effect on likelihood of being a target. In columns 4 through 6, we add Accretive Bidders to the regression specification. The size of the coefficient of Book Bidders drops to 0.021, while the coefficient of Accretive Bidders is similar as before at 0.032. Importantly, both are significant at the 1% level, suggesting that we are picking up two independent and real effects related to the motives for undergoing an acquisition.
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 , we separate the sample into two sub samples according to the earning persistence of each firm's industry. Based on the accounting literature, we argue that earning persistence of a firm is related to the industry in which it operates. Industries for which earnings are more persistent may induce managers to seek out more earnings accretive acquisition deals. Hence, we roughly classify a firm's earning persistence according to its one digit SIC code. For firms with SIC code 2, 5, 7, 8 and 9 (which are mostly the Food, Services and Administration industries), we assume that their earnings tend to be relatively persistent.
For firms with SIC codes of 0, 1, 3, 4 and 6 (which are commodity firms, heavy machinery and manufacturing, transportation and financial firms), we assume that their earnings tend to be only weakly persistent. These latter industries are more cyclical, and as per Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999), Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna (2005) , and Richardson (2006) . Column 5 contains the firms in industries denoted as strongly persistent, whereas column 6 contains those firms in industries with less persistent earnings. We find that the effect of our viable buyer variables are much stronger in the sub-sample of firms with stronger earning persistence. This indicates that acquisitive firms in the earning-persistent industries may be more likely to seek out accretive deals as the primary motivation for undergoing a deal.
In Table 4 , we then test whether our measure of viable buyers based on intrinsic value (RIM Bidders) is related to the likelihood of being a target. Due to the increased restrictions on the sample selection owing to data availability, the number of observations in the analysis based on the intrinsic value-based variable (RIM Bidders and RIM Targets) is lower than the EPS and Book based variables, so some caution is warranted in contrasting these with the earlier results contained in Tables 2 and 3 . That said, while some observations are lost, we believe that by using a valuation model, we are better able to distinguish between the market-driven story (where rational managers take advantage of irrational market) and the agency story (where the managers make mistakes or are doing empire building and destroying shareholders' value). A valuation model helps us reduce errors in pricing the targets by combining both book value and earnings into a single metric in a theoretically coherently way. If the rational managers-irrational markets story is true, then after removing errors in our measure of viable buyers (and targets), we should observe an increase in our estimated coefficients. If we see the opposite, then it's most likely driven by managerial errors (or agency problem) and not market mis-valuation.
We find that our viable buyer variable, RIM Bidders, is positively related to the likelihood of being a target with a coefficient of 0.041 and is significant at the 1% level. Hence, if the number of RIM Bidders goes up from the median level to the maximum, the probability of being a target increases by 2% in absolute terms, which is a fairly significant increase of 74% from the predicted probability of 2.7% at the mean. Hence, the coefficients have significant economic meanings. In column 4, we add the Accretive Bidders and Book Bidders. The Accretive Bidders variable has a similar effect as in Tables 2 and 3 , with a coefficient of 0.041 while Book Bidders is slightly negative and insignificant. The coefficient of RIM Bidders drops to 0.022 while still significant at 1%. Hence, the number of EPS based viable buyers has the most important effect on the likelihood of being a target.
Overall, the evidence presented in Tables 2 through 4 provides strong support for Hypothesis 1, suggesting that when a firm has more viable buyers, it is more likely to be acquired. Extending this result to those firms that make acquisitions, Brealey, Myers, and Allen's (2008) "bootstrap" game is arguably still played these days.
Predicting the Likelihood of Stock-Financed Deals Based on the Number of Viable Buyers
Given that we find the positive association between merger activities and the number of viable buyers, we now investigate whether our measures of viable buyers or targets are related to the use of stock as the medium of exchange in the acquisition. We run probit regressions with time and industry fixed effects and cluster the standard errors at industry level. In addition to the control variables of targets' financial information in merger likelihood, we also use the deal characteristics (i.e., whether the deal is tender offer or not ) as control variables in the regressions as the literature generally finds it relevant. The dependent variables is a dummy variable Stock Only takes the value of 1 if the deal only uses stock as method of payment and 0 otherwise. We pair the target's number of viable buyers and the acquirer's number of viable targets in each regression. Again, we use the CDF transformation of the independent variables in the regressions.
We first estimate probit regressions with the number of viable buyers and targets based on whether the deal is earnings accretive and report the results of the marginal effects in Table 5 .
We find that the use of stock is positively related to the variables Accretive Bidders and Accretive Targets, although the coefficients are not significant. The signs of the control variables mostly agree with the literature. Tender offer and leverage both predict a less likelihood of using stock in payment while market to book ratio predicts a higher chance of using stock in payment. Also, we find that when the targets have more liquidity, the deals are more likely to be paid in stock.
In Table 6 , we investigate the use of stock and book based viable buyers and targets. Columns 1 to 3 consider only those viable bidders/targest based on book value. The use of stock is negatively related to Book Bidders, however the coefficients are not significant. More importantly, we find that the use of stock is positively related to the number of viable targets (Book Targets) and the coefficients are significant at 5% level. In column 4, we add the EPS-based variables (Accretive Bidders and Accretive Targets) and the estimated coefficient for Book Targets increases. We also test the effect of book buyers and targets in the sub samples of firms with strong earning persistence (column 5) and firms with weak earning persistence (column 6). We find that the effect of number of book targets on the use of stock is stronger (with a coefficient of 0.183) in the group of firms with weak earning persistence. The coefficient for Book Targets is still positive but not significant in the group of firms with strong earning persistence (see column 5).
To highlight the economic significance of our findings, we use the result from the third regression as shown in column 3. The predicted probability of using stock as the only method of payment in the third regression is 23.2% at the mean of regression variables. So, for a firm with average attributes across the board, including the number of viable buyers and targets, the (unconditional) probability of using stock as the only method of payment is 23.2%. Observe that the coefficient for the Book Targets in this marginal regression is 0.11. Hence, if the number of viable targets for an acquirer goes up from the median level to the maximum, the probability of Stock Only deals increases by 5.5%, which is a fairly significant increase of 23.7% from the predicted probability of 23.2% at the mean. Here again, it appears that our results are economically meaningful.
In Table 7 , we also investigate whether our measures of viable buyers and targets based on intrinsic value (RIM Bidders and RIM Targets) are related to the use of stock in the acquisition.
We find that the use of stock is positively related to the viable buyers. The coefficient for RIM Bidders is 0.12 at 5% significant level after adding Industry P/V Level and Standard Deviation in column 3. However, it's no longer significant after adding EPS and Book based viable buyers and targets variables (as see in column 4). Book Targets has a coefficient of 0.207 and is significant at 1% level.
Overall, the results provide some evidence supporting our second hypothesis, in particular, for the number of viable targets based on book values. This suggests that when a firm's stock price is high relative to other firms in the same industry, the firm tends to use stock as method of payment to swap it for hard assets.
Robustness of Results to the Acquisition Premium
One may argue that our specification of 20% premium is arbitrary, hence we run a sensitivity analysis with different specifications of the premium. We use premia of 30% and 40% in our hypothesized deals. We then calculate the corresponding viable buyers and targets and repeat the regressions. What we find is that while the size of the coefficients drops slightly as compared with the results reported earlier, the significance levels are almost the same. Hence, our results are not likely to be caused by our specification of 20% premium. The drop of magnitude can be due to the lower economic value gleaned with the higher required premium in the hypothesized deals while the average premium in actual deals is only 25%.
Conclusion
In this paper, we take a novel approach to testing theories relating acquisitions to market misvaluation. We argue that prior empirical tests of this relationship suffer from two problems. First, they either focus on the ex post sample of merger firms or second, they rely on some valuation model which may be of little interest to the actual merger decision-makers. We take the core of the theories that the acquirers want to swap their stocks for cheap assets. An economic shock can cause an uneven adjustment of stock prices among firms in the economy, creating opportunities for such stock-based mergers. We compute three measures of the number of viable buyers for a target firm based on whether the deal is accretive to the acquirers based on earnings, book values, or intrinsic value. We find that the likelihood of being a target is positively related to the number of viable buyers for the firm, and that the likelihood of observing stock as a method of payment is positively related the number of viable buyers for each target and the number of stock targets for each acquirer. Overall, our findings provide a direct link between the likelihood of a merger and market mispricing. Our results indicate that even though managers appear to be trying to increase their earnings or book value, they may be trying to increase their firms' intrinsic values as well.
Appendix A: SDC Data Details
Form of the Transaction: 10 codes describing the specific form of the transaction: M (MERGER): A combination of business takes place or 100% of the stock of a public or private company is acquired.
A (ACQUISITION): deal in which 100% of a company is spun off or split off is classified as an acquisition by shareholders.
AM (ACQ OF MAJORITY INTEREST): the acquiror must have held less than 50% and be seeking to acquire 50% or more, but less than 100% of the target company's stock. AP (ACQ OF PARTIAL INTEREST): deals in which the acquiror holds less than 50% and is seeking to acquire less than 50%, or the acquiror holds over 50% and is seeking less than 100% of the target company's stock.
AR (ACQ OF REMAINING INTEREST)
: deals in which the acquiror holds over 50% and is seeking to acquire 100% of the target company's stock.
AA (ACQ OF ASSETS): deals in which the assets of a company, subsidiary, division, or branch are acquired. This code is used in all transactions when a company is being acquired and the consideration sought is not given.
AC: (ACQ OF CERTAIN ASSETS): deals in which sources state that "certain assets" of a company, subsidiary, or division are acquired. R (RECAPITALIZATION): deals in which a company undergoes a shareholders' Leveraged recapitalization in which the company issues a special one-time dividend (in the form of cash, debt securities, preferred stock, or assets) allowing shareholders to retain an equity interest in the company. B (BUYBACK): deals in which the company buys back its equity securities or securities convertible into equity, either on the open market, through privately negotiated transactions, or through a tender offer. Board authorized repurchases are included. EO (EXCHANGE OFFER): deals in which a company offers to exchange new securities for its equity securities outstanding or its securities convertible into equity.
Transaction Type Code: Code number for the type of transaction (e.g. 1=DI): 1 = Disclosed Value: indicates all deals that have a disclosed dollar value and the acquiror is acquiring an interest of 50% or over in a target, raising its interest from below 50% to above 50%, or acquiring the remaining interest it does not already own.
offer of determined duration to acquire a public company's shares made to equity holders. The offer is often conditioned upon certain requirements such as a minimum number of shares being tendered. 5 = Spinoffs: indicates a "spinoff," which is the tax free distribution of shares by a company of a unit, subsidiary, division, or another company's stock, or any portion thereof, to its shareholders. TF tracks spinoffs of any percentage. 6 = Recapitalizations: indicates a deal is a recapitalization, or deal is part of a recapitalization plan, in which the company issues a special one-time dividend in the form of cash, debt securities, preferred stock, or assets, while allowing shareholders to retain an equity interest in the company. 7 = Self-Tenders: indicates all deals in which a company announces a self-tender offer, recapitalization, or exchange offer. In a self-tender offer a company offers to buy back its equity securities or securities convertible into equity through a tender offer. A company essentially launches a tender offer on itself to buy back shares. 8 = Exchange Offers: indicates a deal where a public company offers to exchange new securities for its outstanding securities. Only those offers seeking to exchange consideration for equity, or securities convertible into equity, are covered in the M&A database. See EXCHANGE OFFER DATABASE for transactions involving debt. 9 = Repurchases: indicates all deals in which a company buys back its shares in the open market or in privately negotiated transactions or a company's board authorizes the repurchase of a portion of its shares. 10 = SP: indicates all deals in which a company is acquiring a minority stake (i.e. up to 49.99% or from 50.1% to 99.9%) in the target company. 11 = Acquisitions of Remaining Interest: indicates all deals in which a company is acquiring the remaining minority stake (i.e. from at least 50.1% ownership to 100% ownership), which it did not already own, in a target company. The acquiring company must have already owned at least 50.1% of the target company and would own 100% of the target company at completion. 12 = Privatizations: indicates a government or government controlled entity sells shares or assets to a non-government entity. Privatizations include both direct and indirect sales of up to a 100% stake to an identifiable buyer and floatations of stock on a stock exchange. The former is considered an M&A transaction and will be included in the quarterly rankings; the latter will not.
Appendix B: Empirical Variable Definitions
The variables used in the empirical analysis are defined as follows:
• Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets.
• M/B is the ratio of market value of common equity to book value of common equity.
• ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets.
• Leverage is the ratio of sum of long term and short term debt (Compustat items: dltt and dlc) to total assets.
• P/E is the ratio of stock price to the earning per share.
• Liquidity is the ratio of net current asset (i.e. current asset minus current liabilities) to total assets
• Num Takeover is the number of takeovers in the target's SIC two digit industry.
• Tender Offer is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal form is tender offer and 0 otherwise.
• Accretive Bidders is the number of EPS based viable buyers for a firm (see section 3.4 for more detailed explanation).
• Accretive Targets is the number of EPS based viable targets for a firm (see section 3.4 for more detailed explanation).
• Book Bidders is the number of book value based viable buyers for a firm (see section 3.4 for more detailed explanation).
• Book Targets is the number of book value based viable targets for a firm (see section 3.4 for more detailed explanation).
• RIM Bidders is the number of intrinsic value (calculated by residual income model) based viable buyers for a firm (see section 3.4 for more detailed explanation).
• RIM Targets is the number of intrinsic value (calculated by residual income model) based viable targets for a firm (see section 3.4 for more detailed explanation). The dependent variable is takeover dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is a takeover target and 0 otherwise. The independent variables (except dummy variables) in the regressions are transformed by empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF). Column 5 includes only firms in industries with strong earning persistence and column 6 includes only firms in industries with weak earning persistence. We run probit regressions and report the marginal effects in the table. We control the year fixed effect and industry fixed effect in all regressions and cluster the standard errors at the industry level. We report standard errors in parentheses. ***,** and * represents 1%, 5% and 10% significant level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) The dependent variable is stock only dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal only uses stock as method of payment and 0 otherwise. The independent variables (except dummy variables) in the regressions are transformed by empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF). We run probit regressions and report the marginal effects in the table. We control the year fixed effect and industry fixed effect in all regressions and cluster the standard errors at the industry level. We report standard errors in parentheses. ***,** and * represents 1%, 5% and 10% significant level.
(1) The dependent variable is stock only dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal only uses stock as method of payment and 0 otherwise. The independent variables (except dummy variables) in the regressions are transformed by empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF). Column 5 includes only firms in industries with strong earning persistence and column 6 includes only firms in industries with weak earning persistence. We run probit regressions and report the marginal effects in the table.
We control the year fixed effect and industry fixed effect in all regressions and cluster the standard errors at the industry level. We report standard errors in parentheses. ***,** and * represents 1%, 5% and 10% significant level.
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